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The Inexplicability of Kant’s Naturzweck:
Kant on Teleology, Explanation and Biology
by James Kreines  (New Haven)
Abstract: Kant’s position on teleology and biology is neither inconsistent nor obsol-
ete; his arguments have some surprising and enduring philosophical strengths. But
Kant’s account will appear weak if we muddy the waters by reading him as aiming to
defend teleology by appealing to considerations popular in contemporary philos-
ophy. Kant argues for very different conclusions: we can neither know teleological
judgments of living beings to be true, nor legitimately explain living beings in teleo-
logical terms; such teleological judgment is justified only as a “problematic” guide-
line in our search for mechanistic explanations. These conclusions are well supported
by Kant’s defense of his demanding analysis, according to which teleological judg-
ment literally applies to a complex whole only where teleology truly explains the
presence of its parts.* 0
Kant’s discussion of teleology, explanation, and biology in the
Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) appears to present stunningly
inconsistent answers to even the most straightforward questions. Can
biological phenomena be explained in mechanistic terms? Kant seems
to answer both “no” and “maybe” – sometimes within the space of a
few lines. On the one hand, he claims that “organized beings” cannot
0 I refer to Kant’s writings from the Akademie edition, Kants Gesammelte
Schriften. Ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–. Cited by
Volume and Page.
All citations not otherwise identified are from Kritik der Urteilskraft, Bd. 5 from
the Akademie edition. Translations from Critique of the Power of Judgment.
Translated by Guyer and Mathews. Cambridge 2000. Translations occasionally
modified.
EE refers to the posthumously published first introduction to the Critique of the
Power of Judgment, cited by the Akademie edition Volume and Page. Also trans-
lated by Guyer and Mathews.
A/B indicates standard references to Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ed. R. Schmidt.
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1956. Translations from Critique of Pure Reason.
Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge 1998. Translations occa-
sionally modified.
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be explained “in accordance with merely mechanical principles of
nature”. He includes living beings insofar as he takes this to make
impossible “a Newton who could make comprehensible even the gen-
eration of a blade of grass”. On the other hand, he immediately insists
on leaving open the possibility of “mere mechanism” as the “ground”
or “origination” of living beings (5: 400).1 Is teleology legitimately
applicable to biological phenomena? Kant seems to answer both “yes”
and “no”. On the one hand, organized beings are supposed to be not
only mechanically inexplicable but also to require specifically teleo-
logical explanation. And Kant claims that our experience of living
beings does always suggest the need for teleological judgment (e.g. 5:
366; 5: 386). On the other hand, Kant repeatedly denies that we
can legitimately explain (erklären) living beings in teleological terms,
and he refers instead to the “inexplicability” of the “natural end” or
Naturzweck (5: 395).2
Kant’s interpreters generally try to resolve these tensions by attribut-
ing them to the interference of factors extraneous to Kant’s analysis of
teleological judgment. Recent interpreters tend in particular to see
Kant’s analysis as, at least in part, a defense of teleological explanation
in biology. Some say that Kant only seems to deny such a role for tele-
ology, because he is independently committed to an artificially narrow
use of the term “explanation” (Erklärung).3 Some say that Kant only
doubts the legitimacy of teleological explanation because he makes
outdated assumptions about intelligent design; others more recently
say that Kant means to defend teleology by questioning just such
assumptions.4 And some argue that Kant’s independent ambitions to
address problems concerning freedom and morality in the KU require
1 Citations in the text not otherwise identified are from KU; for references to
Kant’s works, see my list of abbreviations below. In this passage, the “mere mech-
anism” is missing in the Cambridge translation. See also (5: 418).
2 For example: “teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature
[…] without presuming thereby to explain it (ohne sich anzumaßen sie darnach zu
erklären)” (5: 360; Kant’s emphasis). “Positing ends of nature in its products […]
belongs only to the description of nature (Naturbeschreibung)” but “provides no
information at all about the origination and the inner possibility of these forms,
although it is that with which theoretical natural science is properly concerned”
(5: 417; see also 5: 411).
3 See especially Zumbach 1984, e.g. 123.
4 For the former approach, see MacFarland 1970, 106 and 111; for the latter,
see Zumbach 1984, 12; Allison 1991, 33–4; Warnke 1992, 45; Ginsborg 1997,
2001.
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him to make claims about living beings which are unsupported by his
own analysis.5
Though I am indebted to recent interpreters on a number of points,
I argue for a very different overall account. Kant consistently claims
that we can never legitimately explain living beings in teleological
terms. This claim is absolutely central to his undertaking, and does not
create a tension within Kant’s account which needs to be explained
away. On the contrary, Kant is arguing for the existence of what is sup-
posed to be a very real tension: on the one hand, our experience of liv-
ing beings inevitably suggests to us a form of teleological judgment
which is indispensably useful; on the other hand, such teleological judg-
ment carries strong explanatory implications which render it problem-
atic. Furthermore, Kant’s conclusions emerge directly from his analysis
of teleological judgment in a tightly unified line of argument. This
analysis, properly understood, cannot be married to any claim that we
may legitimately employ some form of teleological explanation to ac-
count for living beings. Finally, there is nothing obsolete about Kant’s
argument and conclusions specifically concerning teleology, expla-
nation and biology. Alternative contemporary accounts require the re-
jection of one or another of Kant’s central premises, and this carries
real philosophical costs. Or so I will argue.
Kant’s overall argument is unified and driven throughout by recog-
nition of a crucial peculiarity of teleological judgment. Appreciating
this peculiarity requires noting that Kant does not think that expla-
nation (Erklärung) is a purely pragmatic or subjective notion. That
is, he does not think that an account qualifies as explanatory solely
in virtue of describing an explanandum in a way which addresses
the pragmatic interests or subjective point of view of a specific audi-
ence. Explaining something must always involve some way of getting
at why it is as it is, or why it happens as it does – some way of getting
at the real underlying causes or determining factors. I will mark this
point by saying that Kant holds an “objective” notion of expla-
5 See especially Zanetti 1995, 49. It is true that Kant aims to draw conclusions con-
cerning practical philosophy. But this ambition is not itself responsible for the
tension: Kant argues on grounds specifically concerning teleology and biology
that teleology and mechanism conflict in a way that rules out the possibility a
role for teleological explanation in empirical science. See also Guyer 2001a, 383,
who stresses Kant’s moral argument, but also notes the argument internal to
Kant’s discussion of teleology and biology for the problematic status of teleologi-
cal judgment of nature.
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nation.6 Now it does not seem natural to associate judgment generally
with explanation: generally speaking a judgment “S is P” would be
true if and only if S can truly be described as P, and it would be irrel-
evant whether P explains S or vice-versa. But Kant’s argument is
driven by the recognition that a teleological judgment “M is for E”
implies more than just that M can be truly described as benefiting E; it
implies that the benefit to E explains M. And what is important about
this for Kant’s argument is not any requirement it might impose on
how E and M appear given particular subjective perspectives or prag-
matic interests. What is crucial is the requirement that M really occurs
specifically for the sake of E, or that the benefit to E plays some real
role in causing, determining or bringing about M.7
This principle connecting teleological judgment and explanation
drives Kant’s initial argument that mere relations of benefit do not
themselves justify the application of the concept of a Naturzweck (sec-
tion 1). And this principle is built into Kant’s requirement that a true
Naturzweck would have to be an organized being (section 2). The same
principle opens up the space for Kant to claim that actual living beings
appear to us to be mechanically inexplicable Naturzwecke while deny-
ing that we can know them to be such (section 3). And the same prin-
ciple lends real philosophical strength to Kant’s argument that a truly
organized being would have to originate in a concept, blocking any
possibility of empirical knowledge of real organization in nature (sec-
6 I do not mean to suggest that there is some other “subjective” type of expla-
nation, but to capture a commitment concerning the nature of explanation gen-
erally. As will be clear below, this commitment does not exclude contextual vari-
ation. Nor do I mean to say that addressing pragmatic interests somehow
disqualifies an account from being explanatory, only that this in itself is not suf-
ficient. Kant himself raises the possibility that “subjective principles” might lead
us to judge in teleological terms an object whose “explanation” (Erklärung)
would require not teleology but rather mechanism (EE 20: 218). See also Mac-
Farland’s (1970, 95 note 1) reading of Kant’s use of Erklären in the KU as “ob-
jective explanation”. And also Kitcher’s (1986, 213) contrast between Kant and
anti-realist “followers of Mach and Duhem”: “Kant’s proposal […] is that there
is an objective notion of scientific explanation”.
7 My formulation of the peculiarity of teleological judgment is heavily indebted to
Wright’s “etiological” analysis (1975, 24; see also 81). As discussed below, Wright
argues from here to conclusions very different from Kant’s. Compare also Gar-
rett 1999, 310, on earlier modern treatments of teleology: “Teleology is the phe-
nomenon of states of affairs having etiologies that implicate, in an explanatory
way, likely or presumptive consequences of those states of affairs. No proposed
teleological explanation, no matter how compelling, can be correct unless it cites
an actual example of teleology” (my emphasis).
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tion 4). With this unified line of argument in hand, we can understand
why teleological judgment is both justified (in virtue of a crucial role
guiding the scientific investigation of living beings) and yet also inevi-
tably problematic (in virtue of its explanatory implications) (section 5).
Interpreters often see Kant as denying the principle connecting teleo-
logical judgment and explanation, because they see this as the only way
to eliminate a tension internal to Kant’s analysis. I argue that these
readings are mistaken (section 6), and that Kant intends the tension
specifically to limit the status of teleological judgment of nature and to
prevent any intrusion of theology into empirical science (section 7).
And Kant’s denial that there can be any room for teleological expla-
nation in any empirical science is not contradicted or even mitigated by
the solution of the “Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment”
(section 8). I conclude by showing that Kant’s analysis is incompatible
with contemporary defenses of function explanation in biology, but has
philosophical strengths of its own (section 9).
Finally, the interpretations I criticize may well be motivated by char-
ity to find in the KU currently popular lines of thought – a defense of
teleological explanation similar to contemporary forms of nonreduc-
tive physicalism, an appeal to the multiple realizability of functions,
etc.8 I embrace the goal of charity, but argue that it is not well served in
this case. For I argue that these contemporary views fit poorly with
Kant’s arguments, so that introducing them can only muddy the philo-
sophical waters. Furthermore, philosophical views generally tend to
have weaknesses as well as strengths, and it is hardly charitable to
burden Kant with any weaknesses of contemporary views which his
own approach need not share. Charity is crucial if we are to discover
and understand the lasting philosophical importance of figures in the
history of philosophy. But charity should not mean that we seek to in-
terpret Kant’s conclusions so that they are as near as possible to those
favored by contemporary tastes. It should mean rather that we seek to
understand the real philosophical strengths of Kant’s arguments – even
and especially where those arguments support conclusions which chal-
lenge contemporary tastes, and so promise to broaden our understand-
ing of the fundamental philosophical possibilities. That, in any case, is
the charity I aim for here.
8 E.g. Zumbach 1984, 91 and 112 note 23; Meerbote 1984; Ginsborg 2001, 247 and
256 note 18.
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1. Why Relative Purposiveness Does Not Justify Teleological Judgment
Kant begins the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” with
an analysis of the teleological judgment of natural phenomena, or – in
his terms – of the concept of a Naturzweck (“natural end” or “natural
purpose”). It is crucial to avoid the common but mistaken view that
Naturzweck is just Kant’s “expression for biological organisms”9. If
that were so, then Kant would merely be analyzing an empirical con-
cept like living being or organism, which (by his own lights) could not
result in an extension of our knowledge but merely the clarification or
explication of the concept. If we go down this path then Kant will seem
to be trying to dictate by means of conceptual analysis how actual liv-
ing beings must be – an unlikely undertaking for the philosopher who
broke with traditional metaphysics precisely by denying the possibility
of cognizing objects “through mere concepts” (Bxiv).10 What Kant pro-
poses instead is an analysis of the conditions under which a teleological
judgment would be true specifically of a natural being. The correspond-
ing concept of a Naturzweck is constructed to apply by definition to
anything which meets those conditions. Kant will also consider the
degree to which this analysis applies to actual living beings, and so the
degree to which it makes sense to judge them in teleological terms or to
judge them to be Naturzwecke. It is impossible to understand Kant
without distinguishing the analysis and its application; his basic point
will be that the proper analysis of teleological judgment carries such
strong implications that its application to nature is bound to be prob-
lematic.
It is worth proceeding carefully with Kant’s initial steps, as they con-
tain often unnoticed keys to his conclusions. This is particularly true
of Kant’s consideration in §63 of relations of benefit between the parts
of nature, or “relative purposiveness”. Kant proposes an example in
which a sea shrinks from its shores, leaving behind sandy soil which
benefits the subsequently flourishing forest of pine trees (5: 367). There
9 Zumbach 1984, 19. See also MacFarland 1970, 102. Many others take Kant to be
analyzing the concept or the real features of actual living beings without explicit
note. I am following the most notable exception: McLaughlin’s careful and per-
suasive treatment (1990, especially 46–7). See also Wood 1999, 219. The analysis
and its application are intertwined in the text, as Kant himself notes (5: 371).
10 See also A5–6/B9–10, and compare Zumbach 1984, 139, and MacFarland 1970,
97. Kant’s continuing commitment in the KU to this touchstone of the critical
philosophy can be seen, for example, in his discussions of “mere logic” (EE 20:
204 and 211–2 note).
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may well be some reason to judge sea, sand and trees in teleological
terms. But the benefit to the trees does not itself provide such a reason.
If it did, then there would be reason to judge in teleological terms any
and everything in nature which happens to benefit something else. But
that would be absurd: benefit cannot be a reason for teleological judg-
ment of natural phenomena which make possible human life in arctic
conditions, for “one does not see why human beings have to live there
at all” (5: 369). The question is, then, how to avoid such absurd conse-
quences in a non-arbitrary way? How to give principled reasons why re-
lations of benefit should fall short of justifying teleological judgment?
Kant’s solution turns on the connection between teleological judg-
ment and explanation. The fact that changes in one thing benefit an-
other gives us no reason to doubt that these changes can be explained
perfectly well without reference to benefit or beneficiary, and so no rea-
son to think anything happens because of a function, purpose, end,
etc.11 And that is why relations of benefit give us no reason to judge
natural phenomena in teleological terms. Taking benefit to justify such
judgment would be “bold and arbitrary,” specifically because of its
explanatory irrelevance: “for even if all of this natural usefulness did
not exist, we would find nothing lacking in the adequacy of natural
causes for this state of things” (5: 369). For example, teleological judg-
ment of the movements of sand and sea might be justified if these could
not be explained “without ascribing an end” (ohne […] einen Zweck un-
terzulegen) (5: 368). But the mere benefit of sea and soil to the trees
gives us no reason to doubt that these movements can be explained per-
fectly well without any reference to the pine trees or to any purpose at
all. In Kant’s terms, such “relative purposiveness” “justifies no absolute
teleological judgments” (5: 369). In other words, it does not justify the
literal application of the concept of a Naturzweck. The relation of bene-
fit suggests only a purposiveness which is “contingent” or extrinsic to
the sea; it is merely “external purposiveness” (äußere Zweckmäßigkeit)
(5: 368). Grasping the conditions which would justify teleological judg-
ment of natural beings will require making sense of a contrasting sense
of intrinsic or internal purposiveness (innere Zweckmäßigkeit).12
11 See Kant’s own stress on darum and weil at (5: 369).
12 It is crucial that Kant is not just arguing that sea and sand belong to a non-teleo-
logical class of things (as in MacFarland 1970, 99). In fact, Kant’s introductions
provide other grounds for thinking that all of nature must be judged in teleologi-
cal terms. Kant’s point here concerns not different things but different possible
grounds for teleological judgments; see especially McLaughlin 1990, 43. Mistak-
ing this point can lead to a misunderstanding of Kant’s claim that relative pur-
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Note the indispensable role played in Kant’s solution by both the ob-
jective notion of explanation and the peculiarity of teleological judg-
ment. First of all, say we grant that relations of benefit give us no rea-
son to doubt that an event can be explained in non-teleological terms. If
you held a purely pragmatic notion of explanation, you might still say
that benefit suggests a role for teleological explanation: the existence of
benefit shows that there is indeed another available description of the
event which might well address a different set of pragmatic interests
concerning it. Kant reasons differently: if benefit gives us no reason to
doubt that a natural event occurs because of causes having nothing to
do with purposes or ends, then it would be “bold and arbitrary” to take
this benefit itself as reason to think this very same event can also be ex-
plained by a purpose or end. Furthermore, say we grant this first point,
accepting that relations of benefit do not themselves suggest any role
for teleological explanation. This still presents no problem with describ-
ing the movements of the sea and the sand in terms of their benefit to
the forest. So why should this present a problem for teleological judg-
ment? Only because teleological judgment never just describes, but al-
ways implies an explanation.
2. The Organization Condition
Kant proceeds on the basis of his discussion of relative purposiveness
to argue that a Naturzweck would have to be an organized being. This
‘organization condition’ (as I will call it) requires that the whole system
determines its parts, in the sense that the parts are present specifically
because of their purposes or functions within the whole.
This organization condition is only the first of two parts of Kant’s
analysis; by itself it defines only the general concept of an organized
being, or a Zweck (“end” or “purpose”) – not yet the concept of a natural
posiveness depends on internal purposiveness because only a true Naturzweck
could be benefited. Kant’s point is not just to propose a division between the
types of things which can and cannot be benefited. Kant’s main challenge in
§ 63 is to provide an argument to justify the claim that mere relations of benefit
themselves fall short of grounds to judge nature in teleological terms, or to
consider something (e.g. the system of sand, sea and trees) to be a Naturzweck.
Only with that argument in hand can he draw the further consequence that even
the existence of real relations of benefit will require that some parts of nature
(e.g. the trees) satisfy stronger requirements which better justify the application
of teleology.
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organized being or a Naturzweck in particular. In fact, Kant tends to
explain this first requirement by demonstrating how it is met in the spe-
cific case of non-natural artifacts, such as a house or a watch (5: 372ff.).
To elaborate on Kant’s example, consider a spring in a watch. As with
the movements of sea and sand, there is a sense in which the behavior of
the spring itself can be explained in non-teleological terms: the spring
behaves as it does because of its own material constitution and shape.
But this spring might have been constructed differently so as do to vir-
tually anything: to break when wound, to turn the gears at speeds vary-
ing with the temperature, to make squeaking noises, etc. As Kant says
later, “nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have structured
itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting on precisely the
unity in terms of a principle of purposes” (5: 360).13 And this makes
room for teleological explanation, specifying that the spring and the
other parts of the watch are present specifically on account of the de-
terminate and coordinated functions they are to fulfill within the or-
ganized whole.
In the case of non-natural artifacts, such as a watch, the organization
of the whole determines the parts only via human design. But this par-
ticular aspect of such examples is not itself crucial specifically to Kant’s
claim that teleology would be justified by organization as opposed to
mere benefit or relative purposiveness. What is crucial is only that the
functional organization of the whole (in some way or other) determines
the parts – or that the presence of the parts is (in some way or other)
determined by their functions within the organized whole. In terms of
Kant’s official statement of the requirement, “for a thing as Naturzweck
it is requisite, first, that its parts (as far as their existence and their
form are concerned) are possible only through their relation to the
whole” (5: 373).14
Note how this requirement follows specifically from Kant’s treat-
ment of relative purposiveness. Mere benefit does not justify teleologi-
cal judgment, because it provides no reason to doubt that the benefit
13 This passage actually concerns the more complicated case of living beings.
Another way of putting the point: in an organized system there is a “contingency
of form (in relation to the mere laws of nature)” (5: 396). Compare Wright 1976,
73–83.
14 Kant goes on to connect this requirement to his argument that the only way to
make comprehensible such determination of the parts by the whole is to think
of the system as the product of an idea representing the whole. But the point of
the organization condition itself is independent of this further argument, which
I discuss below.
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itself is just an accidental consequence of non-teleological causes. So
Kant’s analysis must rule out the possibility that the parts of a system
are present for some other reason, and happen by chance to benefit the
whole by fulfilling functions. Thus the analysis must require that the
parts of the system are not present for other reasons – they must be
present specifically on account of functions within the whole, or “pos-
sible only through their relation to the whole”. This is to build the
objective notion of explanation into the analysis of teleology. And this
results in a demand far stronger than any requirement that a system be
‘organized’ only in the sense that it currently has a structure or form
which meets some standard (e.g. is sufficiently complicated, regular, or
appears to us in a particular light). For any requirement of the latter
sort, no matter how demanding, could be conceivably be satisfied by a
system whose parts happen by chance to have come together with the
required structure or form.
As mentioned above, Kant’s first requirement is not enough by itself
for an analysis of the concept of a Naturzweck. For one way this first
requirement can be met is the way it is met in the case of artifacts, which
are non-natural in that they are the products of our own design. So
Kant needs a second requirement in order to rule out artifacts and
narrow the analysis. He needs to narrow his analysis of organized
beings generally (including those organized by the action of an external
designer) to an analysis of naturally “self-organizing” (5: 374) beings.
Or, he needs to narrow this analysis of Zwecke in general to come up
with an analysis of Naturzwecke in particular. Kant seeks to do this by
means of a second requirement again governing the relations between
whole and parts. Considered in these terms, ruling out non-natural
products of design means ruling out the mere imposition of an organ-
izational form or structure onto parts by the work of “a rational cause
distinct from the matter” (5: 373). To exclude the possibility that the
form or structure is imposed from the outside is to require that it is im-
posed from within. And considered in terms of part/whole relations this
means that the parts themselves must be responsible for the organized
form of the whole.
Kant’s own gloss on this second requirement is difficult to follow
because it effectively combines the force of both requirements into a
single statement. Kant says: “it is required, second, that its parts be
combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of
their form” (5: 373). To begin with, the functional organization of the
whole must not be merely imposed by an external designer, but rather
determined by the parts themselves. But the first requirement already
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demands that the presence of parts of a particular type or form must
also depend on the functional organization of the whole. So, drawing
both points together, the parts would have to be both cause and effect
of their own form.
It is imperative that we not confuse the content of this highly abstract
analysis with Kant’s discussions of how the analysis applies to actual
living beings – for example, Kant’s attempt to “elucidate” the analysis
by discussing its applicability to three features of trees: they have parts
which mutually compensate to preserve the whole, they incorporate
matter to grow, and they reproduce (5: 371f.).15 Kant’s applications of
the analysis are a complex topic in their own right, to which we must
carefully attend as we proceed. But concerning the abstract analysis
itself, the most important thing to note is a puzzle concerning how its
conditions could possibly be jointly met. For the two requirements ap-
pear to conflict: the first requires that the parts are determined by the
whole; the second requires that the whole is determined by the parts.16
This puzzle is especially important here because recent interpreters
tend to see it as reason to give a reading of Kant’s first requirement that
is very different than mine. In particular, Kant’s view is often supposed
to be this:
(a) Actual living beings are Naturzwecke, or systems in which the parts seem to us
to be present on account of functions within the whole.
Interpretation (a) substantially weakens Kant’s first requirement, so
that it demands only that the whole seems to determine the parts; and
this would not conflict with the second requirement that the parts really
do determine the whole, thus resolving the puzzle. But I will argue for a
very different placement of the ‘seem to us,’ and so attribute to Kant a
very different view, namely:
15 Interpreters who take Naturzweck to be the empirical concept organism tend
to mistake these three features for part of the content of Kant’s analysis and/or
for an explanation of why actual organisms are not supposed to be mechanically
explicable (e.g. Zumbach 1984, 24–26). But Kant himself says that the three
features are meant to “elucidate” an analysis he has not even completely stated
at this point (5: 371); see especially McLaughlin 1990, 46–47. And see Ginsborg’s
(2001, 255 note 10; and 2004) persuasive arguments that Kant’s important claim
for mechanical inexplicability follows from the first requirement, not from these
observations about what distinguishes living beings from artifacts. I will return to
this passage below.
16 Ginsborg 2001, 236 and 251, gives a nice formulation of the puzzle and defense of
its difficulty and importance; I argue for a different resolution below.
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(b) Actual living beings seem to us to be Naturzwecke, or systems in which the
parts are present on account of functions within the whole.
According to (b), Kant’s analysis does include the full-strength organ-
ization condition, or the requirement that the whole really does deter-
mine the parts. In other words, the “seems to us” is not part of the
content of Kant’s analysis of the concept of a Naturzweck, but part of
this position on the applicability of this concept to living beings. I have
already argued above that it is (b), and specifically the full-strength
organization condition, which follows from Kant’s treatment of the
merely external purposiveness of benefit (as in cases like the sea, sand
and trees). I will continue to argue that (b) is the correct reading, and
that the same full-strength organization condition does a remarkable
amount of philosophical work throughout Kant’s account, lending real
support to conclusions that can otherwise seem to be inadequately
defended and even mutually inconsistent. I’ll then return to discuss in
more concrete terms the point of Kant’s second requirement and the
puzzle of its relation to the first.
3. The Mechanical Inexplicability of the Naturzweck
The full-strength organization condition makes it easy to understand
Kant’s claim for the mechanical inexplicability of Naturzwecke. This
claim does not directly concern actual living beings, but rather the con-
structed concept of a Naturzweck. And mechanical inexplicability is
built right into this concept. More specifically, Kant uses “mechan-
ism” to single out accounts which explain entirely without reference to
any special organization, structure, or arrangement of whole systems.
So mechanism applies to complex systems where the structure and
behavior of the whole is completely determined by the independent
changes of the parts. But Kant defines Zweck as the concept of some-
thing of which this cannot be true: the whole cannot be explained com-
pletely in terms of the independent changes of the parts, for the parts
themselves are only present because of their roles within the organized
whole. Thus the very concept of a Zweck itself rules out mechanical ex-
plicability:
If we consider a material whole, as far as its form is concerned, as a product of the
parts and of their forces and their capacity to combine by themselves […] we rep-
resent a mechanical kind of generation. But from this there arises no concept of a
whole as a Zweck. (5: 408)
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Again, this claim concerns Kant’s abstract analysis, and in particular
the general concept of a Zweck, or any sort of organized being at all.
This claim for mechanical inexplicability is not directly about actual
living beings, and in no way concerns the features which distinguish
them from artifacts.17
We can also understand in these terms how Kant recognizes a sort of
compatibility while also holding that teleology and mechanism are fun-
damentally incompatible. The example of the spring in the watch high-
lights the compatibility. If we want to explain the current behavior of
the spring, considered in isolation, then we can explain in mechanistic
terms. Given a spring of this sort, it will respond to surrounding condi-
tions without consideration of any special whole – it will respond just as
a piece of such metal with the same shape and internal constitution
would respond anywhere. Nonetheless, teleology can explain some-
thing else, namely, why a spring with just these mechanical properties is
present within the whole watch. This is one sense in which Kant refers
to the “subordination” of mechanism to teleology as “means” to an end
(5: 414).
But mechanism and teleology are nonetheless fundamentally incom-
patible when applied to one and the same complex system (such as the
whole watch). When so applied, both purport to account for the origin
of the system. To be sure, there can be distinct but compatible expla-
nations of this origin: two different accounts could both explain in vir-
tue of providing information about different portions or aspects of the
complete causal history of one system. This is a sense in which expla-
nation can vary in context of the different explanatory interests we
might have. But it is crucial that teleology and mechanism, as analyzed
by Kant, cannot be compatible in this way. For teleology and mechan-
ism are conflicting ways of characterizing the complete explanation of
the origin of the system. Teleology requires that, whatever the details
might be, the parts turn out to be present specifically because of func-
tions within the whole. Mechanism requires that, whatever the details,
functions or purposes within the whole play no real role in determining
the form and presence of the parts: the system must be “the product of
the parts and of their forces and their capacity to combine by them-
17 Also: “that a thing is possible only as a Zweck, i.e. that the causality of its origin
must be sought not in the mechanism of nature” (5: 369). See especially Ginsborg
2001; 2004. On the distinction between mechanism in this sense and causality
generally, see also McLaughlin 1990, 152f., and Allison 1991. Compare also
Garrett 1999, 310, on mechanism in earlier modern philosophy.
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selves”, or independently of any relation to an organized whole (5: 408;
my emphasis). And that is why Kant correctly concludes that we cannot
compatibly apply both teleology and mechanism to one and the same
natural system; we cannot consider one and the same thing both to be
and not to be a Zweck, specifically because “one kind of explanation
excludes the other” (5: 412)18.
What does this mean about actual living beings? Only that if they
are natural organized beings, or Naturzwecke, then they cannot be
explained in mechanistic terms. For example, Kant says, “if I assume”
that a maggot “is a Naturzweck, I cannot count on a mechanical mode
of generation for it” (5: 411)19. Yet Kant also leaves open the possibility
that the ground of the generation of actual living beings is “mere mech-
anism” (5: 400; 5: 418). The reason for this is strikingly simple, though
it is usually obscured by the confusion between the constructed concept
of a Naturzweck and the empirical concept living being. Kant simply
denies we can know that living beings really are Naturzwecke. When
one draws upon the “problematic” concept of a Naturzweck, Kant says,
“one does not know whether one is judging about something or noth-
ing” (5: 397).
There are passages some interpret as conflicting with this denial of
knowledge of actual Naturzwecke; I will argue for alternative interpre-
tations of these passages below. But the first and most pressing diffi-
culty concerning Kant’s denial is this: how could Kant possibly rule out
knowledge of Naturzwecke, given his claims that actual living beings
really do seem to fit the analysis? Why shouldn’t the fact that living
beings consistently appear to meet both Kant’s requirements be a
perfectly good reason to think that they really are Naturzwecke? The
answer turns again on the full-strength organization condition. Cer-
tainly Kant thinks that living beings appear to be organized; their form
appears to us as completely undetermined by mechanical laws govern-
ing the matter out of which they are composed; the fit between their
parts is so great that those parts seem as if they must be present in order
to fulfill coordinated purposes within the whole. Living beings thus
18 See also 5: 425f. and Zanetti 1995, 50ff. I argue below that Kant’s solution to the
antinomy does not contradict or mitigate this fundamental incompatibility.
19 Also, mechanism must “always be inadequate for things that we once acknowl-
edge as Naturzwecke” (5: 415). Note that is not an assertion that we can know
living beings to be Naturzwecke, as this would mean we could know of limits to
our ability to explain in mechanistic terms; yet this same passage insists that we
“do not know how far the mechanical mode of explanation that is possible for us
will extend” (5: 415).
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present a case in which “experience leads (leitet) our power of judg-
ment” (5: 366) to the concept of a Naturzweck, or a case in which the
need for teleological judgment is “suggested (veranlaßt) by particular
experiences” (5: 386). But to really be organized requires more than
this – more than a special current structure or form. It requires that the
parts really are present specifically because of their functions within the
whole. Thus we could know something to be a Naturzweck only if we
could really explain part in terms of whole. And Kant will argue that we
can never have insight into such explanations of nature, so that our ex-
perience “exhibits” but nonetheless cannot “prove” the existence of
natural organized beings or Naturzwecke (EE 20: 234).
4. Intelligent Design, and Why We Cannot
Know Living Beings are Naturzwecke
Kant’s argument against the possibility of knowledge of Naturzwecke
turns on his claim for a connection between the Naturzweck and intel-
ligent design. As noted above, this claim has found few friends among
recent interpreters: some see it as an outdated and mistaken assump-
tion about living beings, others as an assumption Kant himself ques-
tions. But we are in a position to appreciate that Kant’s analysis does
indeed justify the claim he does indeed advocate: insofar as a Natur-
zweck had a genesis we can make comprehensible at all, this would have
to be an origin in a concept of the whole system. It is crucial that this
in no way implies the reality of intelligent design, for the argument
directly concerns not actual living beings but rather Kant’s constructed
concept of a Naturzweck.
Kant’s argument addresses a familiar problem concerning back-
wards causation to his own requirement that the functional organiz-
ation of a whole must determine the parts.20 For example, assume for
the moment that circulation of the blood is the purpose or function of
the heart. The beating of the heart would have to be the cause, and cir-
culation of blood will have to be among its effects when present within a
whole body. But before the presence of the cause within the whole sys-
20 MacFarland 1970, 106, stresses the backwards causation problem, but the
argument is far better than he recognizes here. See also Zuckert 2000, ch. 2, and
Guyer 2001a, 383; and 2001b, 265, on backwards causation. And see Spinoza’s
(Ethics Part IV Preface) similar treatment of the house example, itself central to
Aristotle’s discussions of teleology (e.g. Physics II.9).
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tem there can be no such effect. And the effect cannot travel back in
time to bring into place its own cause; it cannot directly cause its own
cause. More generally, before the parts of a system are present, there
can be no functioning whole. So the not-yet-existent functional organ-
ization of the whole cannot itself travel back in time in order to cause or
determine the presence of the parts; it cannot directly cause its own
causes. As Kant says, “it is entirely contrary to the nature of physical-
mechanical causes that the whole should be the cause of the possibility
of the causality of the parts” (EE 20: 236).
The only solution, Kant argues, is that the system must be the product
of a prior concept of the whole. Kant argues by means of an example:
The house is certainly the cause of the sums that are taken in as rent, while con-
versely the representation of this possible income was the cause of the construc-
tion of the house […] The first could perhaps […] be called the connection of real
causes, and the second that of ideal, since with this terminology it would immedi-
ately be grasped that there cannot be more than these two kinds of causality.
(5: 372f.)
In the order of “real causes” the effect cannot precede and so explain
the cause; thus it can only do so as “ideal,” or as represented by a prior
concept. Applied to complex systems: in the order of “real causes,” ef-
fects of the parts within a functioning whole cannot precede and so
explain the presence of those very parts; thus they can do so only as
“ideal,” or as represented by a prior concept. So the only conceivable
genesis of a truly organized being would have to be an originating idea
or concept of the whole and the roles to be played by the parts (5: 393;
5: 407f.). This argument licenses Kant to proceed to link his statement
of the organization condition directly to the requirement that the whole
has an origin in “a concept or an idea that must determine a priori
everything that is to be contained in it” (5: 373).
The best way to appreciate the strength of Kant’s argument here is to
identify three key premises on which it rests. To begin with, the argu-
ment clearly draws on the premise that (i) there is a unidirectional order
of “real causes” in time. The argument does not require any more spe-
cific commitments about causality and explanation which Kant may
otherwise hold, such the idea that explanation must always have the
form of a strict deduction of effects from general causal laws and prior
conditions.21 The argument requires only that a single direction of time
21 See especially Zumbach’s view of the role of this more specific commitment
(1984, 95–7 and 123).
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prevents effects themselves from directly bringing about or determining
their own causes, and so prevents effects from directly explaining why
their own causes occur.
A second premise turns on the idea that the analysis of the concept of
a Naturzweck must build in the objective notion of explanation, placing
constraints on the actual determination or causal history from which a
complex system originates. Kant’s argument would indeed be weak
without this premise, or if the concept of the Naturzweck constrained
only the current structure or form of a system. For no matter how in-
teresting or complicated a current structure or form might be, it can
still fail to be the product of a concept or idea.22 Kant’s more specific
premise (ii) is the full-strength organization condition: in a Naturzweck
the functional organization of the whole must determine the presence
and form of the parts.
Now it is true that some contemporary philosophers propose that
natural selection can also explain in precisely this required sense – can
explain the presence of the parts of living beings in terms of their func-
tions – without any appeal to intelligent design.23 But, first, this con-
temporary “etiological” approach is controversial. Its contemporary
critics charge that any notion of function purporting to account for the
presence of parts will inevitably carry some implication of intelligent
design, which will be inappropriate in an interpretation of natural se-
lection.24 Second, the etiological approach to functions requires a very
different analysis of the conditions under which such functions apply.
In particular, it must specifically require the repeating process of repro-
duction of complex individuals within a larger biological species. Only
this makes possible the claim that the heart (for example) is present on
22 Some readings of Kant’s argument require him to deny this (e.g. MacFarland
1970, 106). But he does not deny it. For example, he attends to the complex
structure of actual organisms and yet refuses to rule out the possibility that they
originate in mere mechanism (5: 400 and 5: 418). And he also points out that the
remarkable structures of crystal formations seem as if designed and yet are mech-
anically explicable (5: 348; 5: 419). (EE 20: 217–8 on crystals does not conflict
with this, for it concerns not “explanation” or “the possibility of the objects
themselves” but rather the “subjective principles of reflection” on objects.)
23 Wright 1976, 24, 81, and 84ff. And (different in some respects) Millikan 1984, ch.
1, especially the definition of “proper function” (28); Neander 1991, 174, and
Godfrey-Smith 1994, 347.
24 See Boorse 1976, Nagel 1977, 282–87, and Cummins 1975, 746, for similar criti-
cisms of etiological analyses, and also Sober’s (1984, 147–55) additional argu-
ment that natural selection does not explain why any particular individual devel-
ops as it does but only the make-up of a general population.
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account of the function of hearts in previous organisms of this species.
The resulting analysis has a complex two-level structure, according
to which teleological notions like function or purpose apply directly to
inherited general and repeatable traits, and through them to the parts
of individual complex systems.25 Kant’s analysis, by contrast, neither
requires the reproduction of individuals within a species, nor applies
to individual parts via repeatable traits. Kant’s analysis is far simpler:
it is composed entirely terms of two requirements on part/whole
relations of a complex system.26 Kant certainly does consider the appli-
cation of his analysis to reproduction within a biological species
(5: 371). The analysis can be so applied by simply treating the species
itself as a complex system. But this will clearly bring with it the very
problem under discussion: it will still be the case that the parts of the
whole (now the species) cannot have come to be present on account of
their effects within this very whole, because they must first be present
in order to have those effects at all. Kant himself reasons similarly
in §80 when contrasting his analysis with alternatives focused on the
mechanisms of reproduction and the generation of ever more compli-
cated and well-adapted species.27 So while there is an alternative to
Kant’s analysis, that alternative is controversial, and it does nothing to
undermine the argument from Kant’s own analysis to intelligent de-
sign. It rather makes clear a final crucial premise, namely, (iii) that the
proper analysis of teleological judgment can and should be stated in
terms of simple conditions on the relations between parts and whole in
a complex system.
Kant’s connection between the Naturzweck and an origin in a con-
cept or idea follows inexorably from these premises. The second prem-
ise requires parts which are present on account of their functions within
the whole. Given the first and the third premises, there will be no way
this requirement can be met save by an origin in a concept or an idea of
the whole and the functions of its parts; for there will be no other way
25 See especially Millikan 1984, ch. 1, on “reproductively established families” and
Wright 1976, 88, on general traits or capacities. Boorse’s (1976) criticism brings
out the pressures on Wright to incorporate more about natural selection into his
analysis.
26 See also McLaughlin 1990, 50: “All determinations of the concept of natural pur-
pose that Kant introduces have to do with the relation of part and whole”.
27 Kant argues that this cannot provide an alternative account of the purposiveness
of living beings, but only “put off the explanation” by raising questions about the
original beginning of this historical process (5: 419). I will return to this argu-
ment briefly below.
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that the effects of the parts within the whole can precede the presence of
those very parts, and so explain how they came to be present within that
very system. There is nothing weak or obsolete about this argument.
The conclusion can be avoided only by rejecting one or another of the
premises, and this would have philosophical costs, to be discussed below.
Kant’s point, of course, is not to argue that actual living beings are
designed or that there is a designer of nature (5: 399). Quite the oppo-
site: Kant’s consistent denial of the possibility of theoretical knowledge
beyond the empirical natural world leads him to deny the possibility of
knowing actual living beings to be Naturzwecke. If the notion of a
Zweck requires an origin in a concept, and if there are no concepts at
work in nature independent of minds capable of representing them,
then the very notion of a Zweck “implies relation to a cause that has
understanding” (5: 393)28. So we could know something to be a Zweck
only if we could know it to be the product of such an understanding.29
And something could be known to be a natural organized being only if
known to be the product of an understanding responsible for the design
of nature, “an (intelligent) world cause that acts according to purposes”
(5: 389; also 5: 400; 5: 410). Our ignorance of any designer of nature
prevents us from having insight into any such explanations of nature.30
And that means we can never know that living beings (or anything else)
really are Naturzwecke. Kant himself summarizes this argument in a
clear and concise manner: “purposiveness in nature, as well as the con-
cept of things as Naturzwecke, places reason as a cause into a relation
with such things, as the ground of their possibility, in a way which we
cannot know through any experience” (EE 20: 234).
28 Though I cannot argue for this here, my view is that Hegel’s response to Kant
requires (in part) denying that concepts are at work in nature only where repre-
sented by a mind, which is why Hegel ties his defense of teleological explanation
so closely together in the Science of Logic with his defense of objective concepts
(Begriffe) and “the idea” (die Idee).
29 “For we can be conscious of the causality of reason in objects, which on that ac-
count are called purposive or Zwecke, only in the case of products of art” (EE 29:
234).
30 See 5: 410 and compare especially Descartes’ response to Gassendi’s first objec-
tion to the fourth meditation.
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5. Justifying and Limiting Teleological Judgment of Nature
We can, then, neither know natural beings to be Naturzwecke, nor make
any headway with teleological explanation of them. Yet Kant does have
something to say for the teleological judgment of living beings: he ar-
gues that it is both inevitable and even justified in that it is irreplaceably
useful to scientific research.
To begin with, it is the specific character of our experience of living
beings which will inevitably suggest teleological judgment to us. We do
not experience at once their genesis and development, but only their
structure at a given time. And because of the rules which form our
experience – the causal principle relating events in time, in particular –
this structure inevitably appears strikingly contingent to us. This fea-
ture is not unique to living beings or due to any special features distin-
guishing them from artifacts: experience of a living being is akin to
seeing a “regular hexagon, drawn in the sand in an apparently uninhab-
ited land” – we “would not be able to judge” this as anything but truly
organized (5: 370). Though we believed this land to be uninhabited and
nothing here to be the product of design, still our experience of the
hexagon itself would suggest that someone created it in accord with an
idea of a hexagon.31
Furthermore, teleological judgment of living beings is supposed to
be irreplaceably useful, but not in virtue of explaining anything. Kant
consistently holds that our explanatory insight into nature must always
be mechanistic. And we must always attempt to discern mechanistic
explanations for everything in nature, even though there can be no
guarantee we can complete the task prescribed by this “regulative”
principle of mechanism.32 Teleological judgment is justified insofar as it
plays an indispensable role in this project; it serves as “a heuristic prin-
ciple for researching the particular laws of nature, even granted that we
would want to make no use of it for explaining nature itself” (5: 410).
31 Why can’t we learn to experience living beings differently? Because Kant takes
the relevant forms of our experience – time and the category of causality – to be
not plastic but invariable. And we do continue to think of (e.g.) the heart in teleo-
logical terms – to take it to have a specific purpose of its own, in terms of which it
might malfunction. See Millikan 1989, Neander 1991, and Ginsborg 2001, 252,
on Kant.
32 See especially 5: 383; 5: 387; 5: 410; 5: 418; EE 20: 218. MacFarland 1970, 89–90
(also 35–6, 131), argues that reflective teleological judgment is a “presupposi-
tion” necessary to our search for mechanistic explanations. See also McLaughlin
1990, 156–7, and Guyer 2001b, 266.
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To see this indispensable role of teleology in “researching the par-
ticular laws of nature,” imagine we were to discover a completely un-
known artifact with intriguing behavior. Kant holds that our epistemic
limitations are such that we can have direct insight neither into what
is and what is not a natural kind, nor into which particular empirical
generalizations are natural laws.33 This raises the threat that we might
mistake an utterly unknown and uncomprehended artifact for a yet
unknown natural kind. Such a mistake would block any inquiry into
the underlying structure of the artifact; for it would suggest instead
primitive natural laws specifying that this natural kind has a natural
disposition to whatever intriguing surface behavior we observe. Judg-
ing it to be an artifact, by contrast, would suggest underlying natural
materials were chosen for inclusion because the natural laws governing
their behavior generate some specifically desired effects. This might
occasion an inquiry into such functions and their overall intended pur-
pose. But it also might occasion a different sort of inquiry, aimed at
better understanding the underlying natural materials and the interre-
lations of the natural laws governing them.
It is precisely this second sort of research project to which are we
supposed to be directed by teleological judgment of living beings. Such
judgment is justified because, given our epistemic limitations, it alone
can prevent us from stalling at the surface presented by living beings,
“wandering about figments of natural capacities” (5: 411). Teleological
judgment guides us specifically toward trying to understand how
smaller and smaller parts of living beings contribute to the functioning
of the whole. For example, the “maxim” that “nothing in such a crea-
ture is in vain” – or that the parts are present not by chance but in order
to fulfill functions – serves as a “guideline” for “observation” directing
us away from the surface behavior and specifically toward inquiry into
anatomy (5: 376).34 The ultimate (though perhaps unreachable) goal of
such research is to analyze living beings until we can form empirical
concepts fit to classify their parts into natural kinds, and to frame natu-
33 On natural laws see for example 5: 183; on empirical concepts and kinds, see for
example EE 20: 212–3. Regarding both see also the “Appending to the Transcen-
dental Dialectic” at A642/B670ff. Compare Ginsborg’s different reading of the
relevance of these topics to Kant on biology (2001, 246–7), and compare also
Cummins 1975, 758–9, on functional analysis.
34 Note that this passage ties the idea of “an order of things entirely different form
that of a mere mechanism” specifically to “a supersensible determining ground
beyond the mere mechanism of nature” – none of which can be the object of the-
oretical knowledge (5: 377).
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ral laws governing how those parts produce systems with just these ca-
pacities. That is, the ultimate goal would be to so improve our grasp on
natural kinds and laws that we can understand living beings as mech-
anistic systems, completely determined by their independent parts.
Teleology thus directs or guides us to seek explanations from which
teleology itself must be excluded. And we can thus “keep the study of
the mechanism of nature restricted to what we can subject to our obser-
vation or experiments, so that we could produce it ourselves, like na-
ture, at least as far as the similarity of its laws is concerned” (5: 383).
This is the sense in which scientific research into “mechanical expla-
nation” itself requires the “subordination” of mechanism to teleology
(5: 417).
Kant’s claims for the inevitability and justification of teleological
judgment of living beings are often mistaken for a claim that living
beings are mechanically inexplicable Naturzwecke. This is especially
true of the following well-known passage:
It would be absurd for humans even to make such an attempt to grasp [fassen],
or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible
[begreiflich] even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that
no intention has ordered; rather, we must absolutely deny such insight to human
beings. (5: 400; emphasis mine)
But the point of this passage is not to rule out the possibility that living
beings originate in “mere mechanism”; indeed Kant’s next sentence
explicitly insists on leaving open that very possibility. The key to this
passage is that it carefully avoids any doubts about mechanical expla-
nation (in the objective sense) or Erklärung. What Kant doubts is rather
that we can successfully “grasp” (fassen), “understand” or “compre-
hend” (begreifen) living beings in mechanistic terms, and he explicitly
makes his claim relative to our human perspective. The point is that,
given our epistemic limitations, ‘grasping’ living beings in teleological
terms is both inevitable and the only hope we have of advancing toward
any explanation of them at all – even though such explanation itself
could only be mechanistic.35
35 Those who take the passage to deny mechanical explicability sometimes see some
hope at least for the claim that practical difficulties make it unlikely that such ex-
planation could be possible for us; see McLaughlin 1990, 158, and Wood 1999,
222. But note that Kant’s denial is absolute or utter (“schlechterdings”), and he
adds that “probabilities count for nothing here” (5: 400). The key features of the
above passage are carefully repeated elsewhere: “absolutely no human reason (or
even any finite reason that is similar to ours in quality, no matter how much it ex-
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It remains true, however, that teleological judgment always implies
teleological explanation, and this is a first reason why such judgment
must be severely restricted in status. Kant says:
Teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least
problematically, but only in order to bring it under principles of observation and
research in analogy with causality according to ends, without presuming thereby
to explain [erklären] it. It thus belongs to the reflecting, not to the determining
power of judgment. (5: 360)
Teleological judgment always carries explanatory implications which
we can never make good upon; so such judgment may be used only
“problematically” to guide “observation and research,” but never ac-
cepted literally into the content of our knowledge of nature. Using
Kant’s technical terms: in our discursive experience the “determining”
power of judgment determines the objects of experience, drawing (for
example) on the form of causal judgments and on ordinary empirical
concepts. Teleological judgment and the concept of a Naturzweck can-
not legitimately play anything like this role. They may be legitimately
employed only because of the need for guidance of our “reflecting”
power of judgment – only, that is, to guide the process of forming em-
pirical concepts fit to capture natural kinds and frame necessary natu-
ral laws.36
The preceding points connect to a number of important further
philosophical ambitions of the KU which cannot be treated adequately
here, in particular: the argument in the two introductions that we also
need the guidance of reflective teleological judgment of nature as a
whole, and the moral conclusions which later sections draw from that
need.37 We must instead return to our specific focus on our initial ques-
ceeds it in degree) can ever hope to understand (verstehen) the generation of even
a little blade of grass from merely mechanical causes” (5: 409; my emphasis).
Guyer 2001b, 275, also correctly recognizes that these passages provide no good
reason to rule out the mechanical explicability of living beings; he sees Kant here
failing to reach a desired conclusion, whereas I deny that Kant endorses or de-
sires the conclusion which does not in fact follow.
36 On the reflecting power of judgment, see especially EE 20: 211ff. and 5: 179ff.
37 I make no claim to defend here these further ambitions of the KU. Regarding
Kant’s case for the necessity of reflective teleological judgment of nature as a
whole: experience of living beings leads us to judge them in teleological terms,
and this in turn leads us to judge nature itself similarly; but this amounts neither
to knowledge of organization in nature, nor to an empirical justification of teleo-
logical judgment. True, the general principle that nature does nothing in vain “is
of course to be derived from experience”. But this is so only in the sense that ex-
perience of living beings “occasions” the principle. Kant immediately contrasts
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tions concerning teleology, biology and explanation; for we can now
understand how Kant consistently holds the views which at first
seemed inconsistent. In fact, we have seen how each part of Kant’s com-
plex position is supported by arguments anchored in the full-strength
organization condition, itself built upon the objective notion of expla-
nation. First, with regard to the question of mechanical explicability,
Kant can indeed legitimately answer both ‘no’ and ‘maybe’: a true
Naturzweck could not be explained in mechanistic terms; actual living
beings cannot be known to be Naturzwecke and so we cannot rule out
their mechanical explicability. Second, with regard to the justification
of teleology applied to living beings, Kant can indeed legitimately
answer both ‘yes’ and ‘no’: teleological judgment is justified insofar as it
sets us an indispensable research project; but when it comes to nature
we may not hope for any insight at all into teleological explanation.
6. Against Weakening the Organization Condition
Our interpretive success so far, however, makes more pressing still the puzzle con-
cerning the tension between the two requirements built into the concept of a Natur-
zweck. If the first requirement can be met only with an origin in a concept of the
whole system (5: 373), and the point of the second is to rule out external design
(5: 373), then the two certainly seem to conflict.
As noted above, interpreters generally have tried to read Kant’s analysis so that it
is free of such a tension between requirements. The most popular proposal is that
Kant’s first requirement demands only that the whole seems to determine the parts,
and this need not conflict at all with the second requirement that the parts really do
determine the whole. In other words, Kant is supposed not to endorse the full-
strength organization condition (or premise (ii) in the argument for a connection to
intelligent design). The first requirement would then demand no special explanation
of the origin of a system, or no special causal history. It would require only a special
current structure or form – namely, one which is sufficiently complicated, complex,
or regular that it inevitably seems to us as if it were designed. The analysis (says Mac-
this with a justification: there can be no “grounds in experience” (Erfahrungs-
gründen) for the principle (5: 376; see also 5: 378–9). The principle is justified only
by facts about us – by our need for guidance given our lack of direct insight into
natural kinds and laws. See also Kitcher 1986, Horstmann 1989, and Guyer 1990;
on the connection to biology specifically, see especially Guyer 2001b. Kant also
seeks to draw consequences concerning practical philosophy from the need to
judge nature in teleological terms. Here too it is crucial that this is not supposed
to require theoretical knowledge that nature is truly organized. On the moral ar-
gument, see especially Guyer 2001a.
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Farland) demands “systems whose parts are so intimately inter-related that they
appear to depend on a plan of what the whole was to be like”; it does not (Zumbach
adds) demand wholes that “literally cause their parts”38. And Kant himself can seem
to suggest this reading after stating the second requirement: “the idea of the whole”
must function “not as a cause – for then it would be a product of art” (5: 373; my em-
phasis). And, “in such a product of nature each part is conceived […] as if existing […]
on account of the whole” (5: 373f.).
But this interpretation, while popular, is a decisive mistake. To begin with, Kant’s
own statement of the first requirement demands specifically systems whose parts
themselves “are possible only through their relation to the whole” (5: 373). Contra
recent interpreters, Kant does not require systems whose parts are such that our judg-
ing them is only possible insofar as we judge them in relation to a whole.39 Thus Kant
repeats explicitly that the very idea of a Zweck or organized being requires a special
“causality of its origin” (5: 369; also 5: 393). And Kant also repeats that the very con-
cept of a Naturzweck also requires a special causal history: “the concept of a thing as
a Naturzweck is a concept that subsumes nature under a causality that is conceivable
only by means of reason” (5: 396; see also EE 20: 234). Note that there are two points
here: First, the very concept of a Naturzweck requires a special causal history,
namely, the organized whole must really determine or bring about the presence of the
parts. And, second, the only way such a causality is “conceivable” is “by means of
reason.” The precise status of this second point and the implications of intelligent de-
sign is a complicated matter to be discussed further below. But none of these compli-
cations in any way affect or mitigate the status of the first point: the concept of a Na-
turzweck simply and directly requires a special causal origin.
Furthermore, this requirement of a special causal origin is not incidental but
rather fundamental to Kant’s entire discussion of teleology. For this is what grounds
38 MacFarland 1970, 104 (my emphasis); Zumbach 1984, 129 (also 20, 127). Allison
sometimes suggests a similar reading, insofar as the analysis is supposed to de-
mand merely systems which “can only be understood” by us in a particular light
(1980, 212). In some cases the confusion between the constructed concept of a
Naturzweck and actual organisms makes this further mistake inevitable: Zum-
bach 1984, 129, for example, reasons that the analysis cannot possibly require
that “wholes literally cause their parts” because then the existence of living
beings would require the reality of backwards causation.
39 For a contrasting recent interpretation, see e.g. Zumbach 1984, 20. Note that
Kant consistently uses the term “possibility” in this connection to refer to the ob-
jective issue of how a system really came about, not the subjective issue of how we
must judge. For example, he explicitly distinguishes issues concerning “the possi-
bility of the objects themselves” from those concerning the “subjective principles
of reflection” on those objects (EE 20: 217). He speaks of “the real ground” of
the “possibility” of a Zweck (5: 220), and he denies we can completely rule out a
“ground of the possibility” or “generation” of living beings in “mere mechan-
ism” (5: 400). It is clearly in this objective sense of “possibility” that teleological
judgment “provides no information about the origination and the inner possibil-
ity of these forms” (5: 417).
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the distinction in the KU between Kant’s discussions of aesthetics and of teleology. It
grounds the contrast between the “subjective formal purposiveness” or “purposive-
ness without a purpose” of aesthetic judgments, on the one hand, and the “objective
purposiveness” of teleological judgments, on the other. The point of the contrast is
not that judgments drawing on the concept of a Naturzweck have an objective status –
or that we can know real Naturzwecke exist – as Kant denies this.40 The point con-
cerns rather the content of Kant’s two analyses: an aesthetic judgment may imply
only that its object has a form which subjectively appears to us as if truly organized,
but a teleological judgment implies that the parts of a system objectively are present
specifically because of their roles in the whole.41
Finally, if we were to remove from the analysis of teleological judgment all ex-
planatory implications about the presence of the parts, then we will contradict nearly
every step of Kant’s extended argument. First of all, we lose Kant’s critique of merely
relative purposiveness: the failure of benefit to carry such explanatory implications
will no longer affect its fitness as a justification for teleological judgment. Second,
it will now be easy to conceive of a system of purely mechanistic origin which is also
a true Naturzweck – we need only conceive of a system which inevitably appears
designed to us but in fact is not. This would contradict Kant’s repeated claim that
we cannot even think (denken) or make conceivable how a genuine Naturzweck could
be non-designed.42 And it would also contradict Kant’s claim that we cannot com-
40 Teleological judgments of natural beings can have only a status which is subjec-
tive (5: 391; 5: 400), not objective (5: 388; 5: 401). This limited status is shared
by all judgments applying to nature the concept of “objective purposiveness”
(EE 20: 236). On this point too, interpreters are led astray by the failure to
distinguish the concept of a Naturzweck from the empirical concept organism;
Zanetti 1993, 348, for example, interprets “objective purposiveness” in light of
the fact that “organisms exist”.
41 On “subjective formal purposiveness”, see e.g. 5: 190; 5: 228; 5: 361; on objective
purposiveness see EE 20: 221; 5: 194; 5: 360. In aesthetic judgment, “purposive-
ness” is represented “on a merely subjective ground”, and in teleological judg-
ment “as an objective ground, as a correspondence of its form with the possibility
of the thing itself, in accordance with a concept of it which precedes and contains
the ground of this form” (5: 192; my emphasis). Kant’s discussion of aesthetic
judgment famously introduces “purposiveness without a purpose”; but this is
“subjective formal purposiveness” (5: 190), in contrast to the “objective real pur-
posiveness” (5: 193) of teleological judgments and the concept of a Naturzweck.
Also, Kant says that, in the case of “objective purposiveness,” “judgment is no
longer purely aesthetic, i.e. a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer judged
as it appears as art, but to the extent that it really is art” (5: 311). I thank Gins-
borg especially for pressing me on this topic.
42 E.g. 5: 393; 5: 396; 5: 400. Contrast Zumbach 1984, 127: “according to Kant […]
functional descriptions are appropriate to parts of those mechanical systems
whose parts are considered to be brought about by the whole”. Zumbach, and
those who follow him, must use terms like “considered” here to blur Kant’s dis-
tinction between denken (think) and erkennen (cognize). The distinction allows us
to think or conceive many possibilities we cannot empirically cognize. If some-
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prehend how one and the same thing could be both a Zweck and a completely mech-
anical whole, specifically because “one kind of explanation excludes the other”
(5: 412; my emphasis). Finally, the weakened organization condition would leave
Kant with no reason for his denials that we can know objects of experience to be
Naturzwecke (5: 397; EE 20: 234); such knowledge would merely require identifying
those natural systems with a structure which is such as to appear designed to us.43
Nor can there be any hope for any alternative interpretation which in some other
way relaxes the demand of the first requirement so as to weaken the tie to intelligent
design and remove the tension between requirements, as in McLaughlin or Gins-
borg.44 For the critical difficulties will affect any step away from the full-strength or-
ganization condition, no matter how small. The basic problem is that any weaker
requirement will fall prey to the argument Kant himself deploys against the idea that
merely relative purposiveness justifies teleological judgment. Kant argues as follows:
the fact that one thing benefits another does not justify the attribution of purposes,
because this benefit might not occur specifically because of any purpose or goal; the
benefit itself might be merely accidental. To exclude such accident is to rule out the
possibility that the parts are present for some other reason and just happen by chance
to benefit the whole by fulfilling specific functions. To rule this out simply is to impose
the full-strength organization condition – to require that the parts are present not for
some other reason, but specifically because of their functions within the whole.45
thing has a structure which we cannot but cognize in our experience in teleologi-
cal terms, then we might not be able to so cognize it also in mechanistic terms.
But that is no impediment to conceiving or thinking that it might in reality not be
designed. Compare: we must cognize our behavior as causally determined, but
that is no impediment to thinking or conceiving ourselves as free (e.g. Bxxviii).
43 If this reading were correct, then we could even know other things (aside from
living beings) to be true Naturzwecke. For example, Zumbach 1981, 72, con-
cludes from his reading of Kant’s analysis that “it is clear given his explication of
the concept, a social group is a natural purpose”; see also a similar suggestion in
McLaughlin 1991, 64. I think the right conclusion is not that Kant misses some-
thing which would indeed be so “hard not to notice” (Zumbach 1981, 72) about
his own analysis, but rather that Zumbach has misinterpreted the analysis.
44 Ginsborg and McLaughlin advocate versions of a less-demanding first require-
ment which depart less radically from Kant. They agree in particular that the
first requirement carries some implications about causal history, or about why
the parts of a system are present. Ginsborg reads the analysis as including the
negative requirement that the origin of a Naturzweck must really be such as could
not be determined or caused by the basic laws governing the motion of matter
alone (2001, 238–43). McLaughlin’s version requires more still: it requires spe-
cifically a form whole-to-part “efficient causality”, but one which is not “a teleo-
logical relation at all” (1990, 50).
45 Consider McLaughlin’s requirement of a non-teleological whole-to-part “effi-
cient causality” (1990, 50). But this would allow systems where the parts fulfill
functions only as an accidental consequence of such a causality. This is why Kant
does, and must, require a specifically teleological relation between whole and
part: the parts must be present specifically for the sake of certain of effects: their
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A closely related point is that only the full-strength organization condition can
make sense of the normative implications of teleological notions, or the possibility
that a part might malfunction or might fail to perform as it ought. As Kant says,
“a teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature as it is with one
of what it ought to be” (EE 20: 240). Now imagine a hexagon traced in the sand which
came about by an extraordinary coincidence. And imagine that its sides are very
slightly unequal, though still close enough that we could not but judge them as de-
signed to make up a perfect hexagon. Surely our inability to judge otherwise would
not make it literally true that the lines making up this purely coincidental hexagon
are themselves slightly defective, or themselves ought to be more perfectly equal in
length. That a system seems a certain way to us might have consequences concerning
how we would wish the system to be, but not consequences concerning how that sys-
tem itself really ought to be. If the parts themselves are to have specific functions
which they ought to fulfill, then it cannot be the case that the connection between
part and function is merely apparent from our point of view. To rule this out is again
to impose the full-strength organization condition – to require that the parts really
are present specifically in order to fulfill specific functions within the whole.46
In sum, Kant provides excellent reasons for the full-strength organization condi-
tion, which he certainly does endorse: teleological judgment of complex systems
implies that the functional organization of the whole really does determine the pres-
ence and form of the parts. We will see below that this claim is not challenged by
either of the two most prominent contemporary philosophical approaches to the no-
tion of function.
7. Kant’s Second Requirement and the Inexplicability of the Naturzweck
To understand Kant’s analysis and the point of its second requirement, we must
reject the assumption that the tension between requirements is a potential defect we
should interpret away. The truth is that Kant himself recognizes the tension, and
functions or purposes within the whole. This is made especially clear by EE 20: 236,
by Kant’s recognition of the normative implications discussed below, and by his
emphasis on the house example itself (which McLaughlin 1990, 49, must dismiss,
saying it “raises more questions than it answers”).
46 I am indebted to Ginsborg’s (2001) enlightening stress on Kant’s recognition of
this normativity, but I do not think her account can make sense of it. She claims
that this normativity of functions carries no implication of origins in a concept or
of intelligent design because it is “independent of questions about […] historical
origin” (2001, 251). But that cannot be right, because it would allow functions
for the parts of merely coincidental wholes. Elsewhere, Ginsborg recognizes the
difficulty: she requires “normative regularities” which “do not hold as a matter
of sheer coincidence” but are rather “laws governing the structure and function-
ing of organisms and their organic parts” (2001, 246). But that now is to require a
special historical origin: one which is non-accidentally governed by norms.
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treats it as a desired conclusion. Most prominently, this tension is Kant’s topic in §74,
which focuses on the “inexplicability of a Naturzweck” (5: 395). Here Kant argues
that the impossibility of empirical knowledge of Naturzwecke follows from the analy-
sis itself, specifically because of a conflict between the two requirements. That is, the
concept of a Naturzweck is “problematic” – its “objective reality” is not “demon-
strable” – because of a conflict: “as a concept of a natural product it includes natural
necessity and yet at the same time a contingency of the form of the object (in relation
to mere laws of nature) in one and the same thing” (5: 396f.)47. We could of course
change the analysis to eliminate the conflict. But we have been attending to Kant’s
arguments that the analysis needs just these requirements in order to draw the most
important distinctions: the first is necessary to distinguish genuine from merely ex-
ternal purposiveness (as in the sea, sand, and trees); the second is necessary to dis-
tinguish systems which by nature or intrinsically would call for teleological judgment
from artifacts. Insofar as these requirements are both justified but conflict in a way
ruling out knowledge that they can be jointly satisfied, Kant is right to deny that we
can know living beings to be Naturzwecke.
Kant goes further still in explaining the point of the second requirement. The
point is not to rule out mechanical explicability, as this is guaranteed by the first
requirement alone. The point is rather to introduce a conflict which can protect
against any intrusion of theology into our empirical knowledge of nature. Given
the single order of real causes, the first requirement demands an origin in a concept.
But the second requirement redirects the force of the first away from any search for a
supernatural intelligent designer, and toward the parts of natural systems them-
selves – ultimately toward their constituent matter. The two requirements might
actually be jointly satisfied if matter itself could represent concepts and organize
itself in accordance – if material nature itself were self-designing or self-organizing.
But matter cannot do this. Here Kant’s analysis justifies more than the merely epis-
temological conclusion that we can never know whether actual living beings are
Naturzweck; it justifies the conclusion that no system exclusively part of material
nature could be a Naturzweck at all.48 This conclusion is intended by Kant:
47 Or, even if we could have knowledge of an external designer of living beings, pre-
cisely this would undercut the sense in which they are natural in the sense of self-
organizing: “how could I count things that are definitely supposed to be products
of divine art among the products of nature?” (5: 397).
48 I will argue below that Kant’s resolution of the antinomy does not back away
from this claim. Note that Kant holds not only that matter is not capable of self-
organization, but also that empirical matter could not possibly be capable of this.
The status of the stronger claim in Kant raises difficult issues about the (sup-
posed) a priori status of the nonetheless empirical concept of matter. See es-
pecially Friedman 2001. See also: “the possibility of a living matter […] contains
a contradiction” (5: 394). Note that this is not to say that Kant is analyzing the
ordinary notion of life, and declaring it to require mechanical inexplicability.
Kant is here arguing against a view which defends “the realism of Naturzwecke”
by claiming to find “intentionally acting causes” in matter itself (5: 394; see also
5: 392). It is the idea of such intentionally acting causality which is supposed to be
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In teleology we certainly talk about nature as if the purposiveness in it were inten-
tional, but at the same time we ascribe this intention to nature, i.e., to matter, by
which we would indicate (since there can be no misunderstanding here, because no
intention in the strict sense of the term can be attributed to any lifeless matter)
that this term here signifies here only a principle of the reflecting, not of the de-
termining power of judgment. (5: 383; also 5: 411)49
The tension between requirements built into the analysis of the concept of a Natur-
zweck is designed to compel this conclusion: the analysis cannot be completely satis-
fied by anything exclusively part of material and empirically accessible nature; so we
cannot accept the literal truth of teleological judgments of nature, or presume that
they really signify objects; such judgments may be legitimately employed only as a
guideline for our research. Thus Kant can protect empirical knowledge of nature
from any intrusion of “something which does not belong to physics at all, namely a
supernatural cause” (5: 383).
What about Kant’s own apparent suggestions that the organization condition
must be weakened? Here we must again be careful to distinguish the content of Kant’s
analysis from his claims about its application. First, consider Kant’s comment that
the concept of the whole must not figure “as a cause” (5: 373). The point is that some-
thing which really meets the second requirement could not be literally caused by “the
concepts of a rational being outside of it” (5: 373); so it can lead us to teleological
judgment not by having such a cause, but only by having a current structure which
nonetheless suggests intelligent design. Kant clearly thinks that living beings have
the requisite structure. But we must not confuse this point about how experience sug-
gests that we should apply the concept of a Naturzweck with the content of Kant’s
analysis of that concept. Kant’s analysis requires more than such a special structure –
it requires that the parts really are present on account of their roles in the whole. Only
this makes possible Kant’s claim that our experience “exhibits” but cannot “prove”
the existence of Naturzwecke (EE 20: 234).
Similarly, Kant certainly does conclude that teleological judgment of nature can
only be “reflecting judgment,” and he sometimes characterizes this limitation using
the “as if” locution. But this is a point about the status of judgments applying the
concept of a Naturzweck; it is not a point about the content of Kant’s analysis. To see
the difference, contrast the placement of the “as if” in two very different interpre-
tations:
(a) The concept of a Naturzweck requires only that it seems to us “as if” the whole
determines the presence of the parts. Thus there need be no problem with the ap-
plication of that concept in teleological judgment.
contradicted by the concept of matter. The same point is made by similar pas-
sages in Lectures on Metaphysics 29: 275 and Metaphysical Foundations of Natu-
ral Science 4: 544.
49 Note that this merely reflective status attaches not just to judgments explicitly
invoking intelligent design; it is shared by all teleological judgments of nature, or
all judgments drawing on the concept of a Naturzweck (EE 20: 241).
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(b) The concept of a Naturzweck requires that the whole determines the presence
of the parts. Thus the application of that concept in teleological judgment must be
restricted to an “as if” status.
Interpretation (a) removes all the problematic explanatory implications from teleo-
logical judgment of nature. But interpreters who go this route remove as well all rea-
son to limit teleological judgment of nature to a merely “as if” status, leaving them in
an awkward position. They must say that Kant has no good reason for the limitation
he places on all teleological judgment of nature, or all judgment drawing on the con-
cept of a Naturzweck (EE 20: 241). Kant would have reason to limit only something
else: judgments drawing specifically on the concept of design.50
The right reading is rather (b). Kant gives one single analysis of teleological judg-
ment of nature, corresponding to one single constructed concept of a Naturzweck.
He distinguishes the unjustified use of that concept from the justified use of the very
same concept. Put another way, he distinguishes a special limited status to which
judgments employing the single concept of a Naturzweck must be restricted. For
example:
The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature serves only for the sake of
reflection on the object, not for the determination of the object through the con-
cept of a Zweck, and the teleological judgment on the inner possibility of a natural
product is a merely reflecting, not a determining, judgment. (EE 20: 236)
Teleological judgment of nature (the application of the concept of the Naturzweck)
has such strong explanatory implications that it must be restricted in status to a mere
subjective validity, and can be justified only as a guide for “reflection on the object”
in our research. Its literal implications need not, and should not, be accepted into the
content of scientific investigation of nature. Although it is occasioned by certain ex-
periences, such teleological judgment is not justified in virtue of capturing any truth
about the natural world – not even a limited or weaker truth about the current struc-
ture of some natural object. Such judgment is justified only in virtue of a truth about
us: we have epistemic limitations that leave us in need of guidance by teleological
judgment (more specifically, guidance is required by our “reflecting” power of judg-
ment, responsible for forming empirical concepts and framing particular laws of
nature.) The resulting merely subjective necessity or validity is compatible with the
50 Probably the most frank about this is Zumbach: he reads Kant as suggesting by
“punning” that the concept we may make only non-determining use of is actually
the concept of “design” itself (1984, 120). Note in addition that the weakened
analysis could not serve to guide research: analytic inquiry into initially hidden
underlying mechanisms is suggested where it is “as if” nature itself requires the
thought ‘those parts are present on account of some role within the whole.’ The
very different thought ‘this whole does not literally cause its parts, but merely
seems as if it does when viewed from our perspective’ would be more apt to in-
spire research into ourselves and our peculiar perspective.
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possible mechanistic explicability of living beings. It is even compatible with the
possibility, which Kant refuses to rule out, that judgments drawing on the concept of
a Naturzweck might be literally true of nothing at all.51
8. The Antinomy and Transcendental Idealism
Kant does offer a sort of resolution of the conflict between the two requirements,
specifically in the “Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment”. Much of what
Kant has to say here depends on his transcendental idealism, and aims to integrate
his conclusions concerning teleology and biology with the central commitments of
the critical philosophy. Given the monumental systematic issues this raises, there can
be no question of a comprehensive interpretation of the antinomy here.52 But it is im-
portant to venture far enough to defend my central claims against the consensus of
recent interpreters that Kant’s solution to the antinomy demotes the status of the
connection between the concept of a Naturzweck and intelligent design to a mere “as-
sumption” or “presupposition”53.
The line of thought behind the recent consensus is this: We are supposed to make
the “assumption” about design on account of the nature of our cognition – because
we have a discursive intellect dependent on sensible intuition. The antinomy stresses,
however, that this is not the only conceivable type of cognition. We can conceive of,
though not know anything about, an “intuitive understanding” – “another (higher)
understanding than the human” which would not be merely dependent on sensible
intuition but rather enjoy a “complete spontaneity of intuition” (5: 406). If the con-
nection between organization and the need for design follows only from the nature of
one among different possible sorts of cognition, then it is supposed to be only an as-
sumption this connection applies to nature, thus removing all reason to doubt the
real possibility of a non-designed organized natural being.
This reading begins on the right track, but ends up attributing to Kant conclusions
for which he does not and cannot argue. It is true that Kant’s argument connecting
51 “One does not know whether one is judging about something or nothing” (5: 397;
also EE 20: 234). “Nothing is to be decided with regard to the possibility of such
things themselves by means of this fundamental principle” (5: 413). And: “it is
entirely consistent that the explanation of an appearance […] be mechanical,
while the rule for judging of the same object, in accordance with the subjective
principles of reflection on it, should be technical” (EE 20: 218). I think that
EE 20: 238 suggests not a different content but that we cannot embrace the literal
content of teleological judgment (contrast Ginsborg 1997, 334).
52 For example, I cannot address here the basic systematic question of why con-
sideration of the Naturzweck gives rise to something which is, strictly speaking,
an “antinomy” parallel to the others found in Kant’s critical writings. On this
topic, see McLaughlin 1990; Allison 1991; Zanetti 1993.
53 Zumbach 1984, 12; Allison 1991, 33–4, and Thompson 1995, 445. See also
Warnke 1992, 45, and McLaughlin 1990, especially 166–7.
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the Naturzweck and intelligent design (§65; EE 20: 236) requires the key premise that
there is a single order of real causes in time – or premise (i) above. And Kant’s ideal-
ism holds that time is only the form of our sensible intuition, and that the principle
demanding a necessitating cause holds only for events in time. So Kant’s key premise
must indeed be limited in application by its connection to our type of cognition.
What this shows is that Kant’s argument concerning design would not apply to un-
knowable, non-spatial-temporal “things in themselves”. But this definitely does not
demote Kant’s key premise (i), or his conclusion concerning design, to the status of a
mere “assumption”. For it is a cornerstone of the critical philosophy that time and
the principle of causality remain constitutive conditions of the possibility of objects
of experience. So as long as we focus exclusively on the living beings familiar from
our experience – considered exclusively as part of material, empirical nature – Kant’s
connection between organization and an origin in a concept must remain in force,
and will continue to generate a conflict within the analysis of a Naturzweck.54
It is true, however, that the antinomy introduces consideration of the intuitive in-
tellect in order to open up the possibility that actual living beings are true Na-
turzwecke. It does so by introducing a merely logical possibility – that is, a possibility
we can think without contradiction but of which we could never have theoretical
knowledge. It opens in particular a logical possibility concerning a “supersensible
real ground of nature” or a “thing in itself (which is not an appearance) as substra-
tum” for material nature (5: 409). If space and time are only the forms of our intu-
ition, then such a ground would not be spatio-temporal, and would not be bound by
the principle that every event is necessitated by a prior cause. So here true organiz-
ation wouldn’t necessarily require a prior representation of the whole as a separate
determining cause. This means that such a supersensible ground might – unlike em-
pirical, material nature – be able to organize itself from within. And this might allow
the organization condition to be met without a violation of the second requirement’s
stricture against systems which are the products of external design. So we can at least
think without contradiction the possibility that the living beings we experience are
true Naturzwecke. We can do so by thinking of them at once in two different but com-
patible ways: (i) as phenomenal, material nature “in accordance with mechanical
laws,” and yet also (ii) as somehow determined or conditioned by a “supersensible
real ground” specifically “in accordance with teleological laws” (5: 409).
54 Meerbote 1995 raises a similar worry about McLaughlin’s reading in particular.
Kant does assign the principle of mechanism a merely regulative status in the
antinomy. But this principle is not identical to the constitutive causal principle
from the “Second Analogy” in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV); see McLaugh-
lin 1990, Allison 1991, and Ginsborg 2004. Also, the conceivability of another
intellect means that this principle “does not pertain to the possibility of things
themselves (even considered as phenomena)” (5: 408; my emphasis). But that will
open the possibility that phenomena in material nature might be Naturzwecke
only insofar as it means we can consider them as grounded by something non-
sensible, and so by something not bound by the constitutive conditions of the
possibility of experience.
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I have defended here neither the need for Kant’s project in the antinomy, nor the
doctrine of transcendental idealism to which Kant appeals. But if Kant is going to
seek such a resolution of his two requirements, then he certainly does have good rea-
son to appeal to the idea of an unknowable supersensible ground of nature. For he
correctly and consistently sees that his analysis rules out the compatibility of teleol-
ogy and mechanism as applied to the origin of one single system considered as ex-
clusively part of material nature. What if there is no supersensible ground beyond
material nature? What if we are instead “justified in regarding material beings
as things in themselves”? Kant is clear: in that case it “would in fact follow” that
no material natural being could be a self-organizing Naturzweck – for it would be
“impossible” for there to be true organization “without intentional production”
(5: 408f.). Similarly, with respect to “one and the same thing” there can be no recon-
ciliation of the two requirements of Kant’s analysis: “if there is not to be a contradic-
tion here,” we must distinguish from natural phenomena “something which is not
empirically cognizable nature (supersensible) and thus is not cognizable at all for us”
(5: 396; my emphasis). And teleology and mechanism cannot compatibly apply to
“one and the same thing in nature”; for
one kind of explanation excludes the other […] The principle which is to make
possible the unifiability of both […] must be placed in what lies outside both
(hence outside of the possible empirical representation of nature). (5: 411f.)55
Furthermore, Kant’s solution here denies us not only knowledge but also compre-
hension or understanding. We can grasp in positive terms neither the “intuitive
understanding” itself (5: 406) nor how the two requirements might be jointly met. If
we try to get beyond consideration of merely logical possibility we inevitably bring to
bear the necessary conditions of our finite cognition. And this brings the key premise
(i) into force, leaving us no way to conceive of organization without an origin in a
concept, and so without external design (5: 393; 5: 396; 5: 400) – thus violating Kant’s
55 Perhaps the central problem concerning Kant’s idealism is accounting for his ap-
parent ambivalence concerning the transcendental contrast between appearances
and things in themselves: sometimes it seems to be a contrast between numeri-
cally distinct objects (e.g. A30/B45); sometimes rather a contrast between two
ways of considering one and the same thing (e.g. Bxviii-xix note; Prauss 1971 and
Allison 1983). While I cannot resolve that problem here, I mean to emphasize
that Kant consistently denies that teleology and mechanism in particular can be
two ways of considering “one and the same thing in nature”. Though I cannot
argue the point here, I think this suggests that interpretations or reconstructions
of Kant’s idealism which rely exclusively on the contrast between two ways of
considering one and the same thing do not yield a form of idealism which can do
the philosophical work Kant envisions in the KU. A further connection to tran-
scendental idealism is that the concept of a Naturzweck is “problematic” (5: 397)
in precisely the sense introduced in the KrV discussion of the concept of a noume-
non: “I call a concept problematic that contains no contradiction but that is also,
as a boundary for given concepts, connected with other cognitions, the objective
reality of which can in no way be cognized” (B310/A254).
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second requirement. In this connection the “Introduction” to the KU compares the
role played by of the idea of the supersensible here to its role in Kant’s theory of free-
dom: it allows a “possibility which cannot of course be understood, although the
objection that there is an alleged contradiction in it can be adequately refuted”
(5: 195)56. That is, we can defend the mere logical possibility that living beings are
Naturzwecke, but can have no theoretical knowledge or even understanding of that
possibility. So whatever the further goals of the antinomy, and whatever the ultimate
meaning of the transcendental idealism Kant appeals to, none of this is meant to ad-
vance our knowledge or understanding beyond the inexplicability of the Naturzweck,
or to introduce a role for teleological explanation in any empirical science of nature.
Finally, these conclusions of the antinomy are crucially important in understand-
ing earlier sections of the KU. For instance, consider Kant’s well-known application
of his analysis to the example of trees, and the three organic processes of growth, self-
maintenance, and reproduction (5: 371f.). This can seem to presume knowledge that
the analysis does truly apply, or that trees and other living beings are truly self-or-
ganizing Naturzwecke. And Kant’s list of three special organic processes can seem to
be meant as an explanation of why actual living beings must be mechanically inex-
plicable.57 But reading in light of Kant’s solution to the antinomy reveals a different
point. What the passage does claim is that these three organic processes show trees to
be unlike artifacts, such as a watch (5: 374): in the case of trees the form of the whole
is not merely imposed by an external designer. But the passage does not assert knowl-
edge that this form of the whole organism is truly organized, or that the parts are
truly present on account of their roles within the whole. Kant thinks that this inevi-
tably seems to be the case to us. But he also rules out any possibility of our knowing
this, or even comprehending it. Kant specifically says here that the possibility of such
organization without design “can be conceived without contradiction but cannot be
comprehended” (5: 371). So this passage certainly does not explain how actual or-
ganisms might be non-designed yet also organized and so mechanically inexplicable.
On the contrary, the passage explicitly reminds us that this is a possibility we cannot
comprehend at all.
56 As far as we can see, freedom too is “inexplicable (just as is that which constitutes
the supersensible substrate of nature)” (5: 196 note). Also, it is important that
no particular concept of God can allow us to understand in a positive sense the
reconciliation of the two requirements of a Naturzweck. A designer God would
violate the second requirement requiring the self-organization of a true Natur-
zweck (5: 397). But any positive way of thinking of a ground of nature as some-
thing other than a designer – as for example in Spinoza – would violate the
organization requirement on Naturzwecke: it would “remove their contingency,
without which no unity of purpose can be thought (5: 393); see also Baum 1990,
Thompson 1995, 449; Allison 2000, 87.
57 E.g. Zumbach 1984, 24–6.
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9. Contemporary Defenses of Function Explanation in Biology
There are, to be sure, contemporary approaches available which do cut the tie
between the notion of function and intelligent design, and consequently can defend
a role for function explanation within biology. But we must not limit ourselves to
choosing between either criticizing Kant’s approach as obsolete in comparison, or
defending Kant’s approach by reading it as anticipating contemporary views. Kant’s
account is fundamentally incompatible with the two most prominent contemporary
approaches, but it is not obsolete. In fact, noting the rivalry between these two con-
temporary approaches, and the difficulties faced by each, can help us to appreciate
the philosophical strengths of Kant’s contrasting account.
The contemporary “etiological” approach turns on an interpretation of natural
selection. This approach agrees with Kant that the notion of function of use in biol-
ogy is teleological and normative, but argues that natural selection can provide the
etiology or causal history which determines such functions for the parts of living
beings. As discussed above, this requires building details about reproduction and
heritable general traits into the analysis of function, and so rejecting Kant’s commit-
ment to a simple analysis governing only part-whole relations within a complex sys-
tem (or premise (iii) in Kant’s argument for a connection to intelligent design).
This contemporary approach has its strengths, but also raises philosophical diffi-
culties. Consider a recently popular example: the perceptual mechanism in a frog
which detects the presence of flies to be caught with a snap of the tongue. Does this
mechanism have the function of detecting flies? If so, then it would be malfunction-
ing if triggered by some other sort of insect, no matter how nutritious. Is the function
rather to detect any sort of catchable nourishment? If so, it would be malfunctioning
if triggered by a diseased and poisonous fly. It can be hard to see how the selection
history itself can decide on a determinate characterization of the normative function,
because all the details about how the mechanism has been used in the past will always
be compatible with different characterizations of its normative function. (Compare
Kripke’s [1982] well-known point about language: the history of the use of a term will
always be compatible with different formulations of the normative rule governing its
use.) The difficulty is compounded by the possibility this mechanism has simply
played very different roles at different times during the evolution of the species, and
perhaps plays a brand new role in the very newest generation of frogs.58 Contempor-
ary versions of these worries are in fact flourishing descendents of a complaint al-
ready present in the KU. Kant argues that a focus on the history of the development
58 The frog example is used by Fodor 1990, 70ff., to argue that an indeterminacy
problem undermines attempts to use the teleological notion of function to build
a naturalistic account of intentionality in philosophy of mind. See also Millikan’s
response (e.g. 1993, 125; 2002). The worry about different roles played in differ-
ent parts of a selection history is stressed by Godfrey-Smith 1994 in his argument
that it motivates a modified version of the etiological approach. On the connec-
tion to “the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox,” see Millikan 1993, ch. 11.
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of ever more adapted species cannot itself successfully account for determinate teleo-
logical functions, but serves only to “put off the explanation” (5: 419).
The alternative approach, also prominent, advocates a non-teleological notion of
function, as in Cummins’ influential “Functional Analysis” (1975). Cummins essen-
tially endorses Kant’s claim that any notion of function which purports to explain
the presence of the parts of a complex system will indeed carry implications of de-
signed artifacts.59 But Cummins takes this to mean that the notion of function useful
in empirical science must not purport to explain the presence of the parts. (That is, he
rejects Kant’s organization condition, or premise (ii) in Kant’s argument for a con-
nection to intelligent design.) The resulting notion of function – or ‘Cummins-func-
tion’ – does not explain how systems came to be formed. Rather, given a complex sys-
tem with some present capacity of interest to us, Cummins-functions explain by
providing an analysis of how the parts currently realize that capacity (1975, 762).
This is not meant to capture a teleological function of the parts, in the sense of some
privileged function for the sake of which each part is supposed to be present (1975,
747f.). Such functions are, because indifferent to causal origins, perfectly compatible
with any sort of purely mechanistic origin. And this sort of function explanation may
be argued to be non-reducible to mechanism on grounds that the functions them-
selves might be realized by multiple different sorts of underlying materials and mech-
anisms.60
This approach too has strengths, but it also raises difficulties. Dropping etiological
implications (and Kant’s organization condition in particular) results in a notion of
function that is indiscriminate. For example, Kant’s analysis is founded on a distinc-
tion between genuine and merely external purposiveness. Cummins’ notion of func-
tion is entirely indifferent to that distinction. Even the benefit of sea and sand to the
spruce trees, given the right interests on our part, provides perfectly good reason to
attribute Cummins-functions to the sand, sea and their parts.61 Furthermore, the
Cummins-functions which apply to a single system can vary freely with the capacity
of interest to us. One well-known example: if we take an interest in the capacity of the
human body to die of a disease, this will be perfectly good reason to attribute some
surprising Cummins-functions to our organs according to how they contribute to
that capacity. So Cummins’ analysis (unlike Kant’s) cannot help to account for how
59 Cummins 1975, 746: “There is, of course, a sense in which the question ‘why is x
there?’ is answered by giving x’s function […]. But it seems to me that the ques-
tion, ‘why is x there?’ can be answered by specifying x’s function only if x is or is
part of an artifact”.
60 Cummins stresses multiple realizability at 1976, 764. For two excellent non-
reductionist accounts of teleology and biology which nonetheless emphasize the
philosophical limitations of multiple realizability considerations, see Papinau
1992, and MacDonald 1992.
61 Millikan 2002, 119: “Cummins-functions can be contrasted with ‘accidental
effects’ only in the sense of effects that do not help to explain the capacity one has
chosen to analyze”. See also Millikan’s examples of clouds with Cummins-func-
tions (1993, 20), and Griffiths 1993, 411, on the Cummins-function of a piece of
dirt stuck in a pipe.
Brought to you by | The Claremont Colleges
Authenticated | 134.173.130.244
Download Date | 2/13/14 6:53 PM
The Inexplicability of Kant’s Naturzweck 307
our explanatory interests are guided away from the accidental effects of many differ-
ent randomly defined chunks of nature, and towards the particular sort of system in
which a specific subset of capacities seem to be natural or intrinsic.62 Contemporary
criticisms tend to stress the related point that Cummins-functions cannot be nor-
mative. Just because we take an interest in the capacity of the sea to support the
spruce trees, this is no reason to think that the parts of the sea ought to function in
this way, so that failure to do so would be a malfunction. And yet the notion of func-
tion applicable to living beings can seem to be normative: The heart could have in-
numerably many different Cummins-function depending on the capacity we choose
to analyze. And yet it seems as if the heart itself has a more specific natural function,
namely, to pump blood. A heart that stops would no longer have the Cummins-func-
tion of pumping blood at all. But we tend to think that a heart which stops still has
the same function, and is now malfunctioning.63
Kant’s interpreters have sometimes wanted to defend him by associating him with
this second contemporary approach, or with something like contemporary alter-
natives to teleology such as “teleonomy”64. But Kant’s view is very different, and in-
compatible. Granted, all positions discussed here are similar in that they deny any
possible theoretical knowledge of intelligent design in nature. But there are very dif-
ferent ways of proceeding from such a denial. This second sort of contemporary ap-
proach reacts specifically by limiting the requirements imposed by the analysis of the
notion of function: removing all etiological requirements yields a notion of function
with no implications of either teleology or intelligent design. Kant proceeds in the
opposite manner. He does not limit or weaken the content of his analysis of the no-
62 As Cummins himself says: “no matter which effects of something you happen
to name, there will be some activity of the containing systems to which just those
effects contribute” (1975, 752; Millikan 2002, 118). The disease example is
discussed by Griffiths 1993, 411. Cummins 1975, 764, responds to a worry that
this indiscriminateness renders his functional analysis trivial. But he recognizes
the indiscriminateness: nothing about functions guides our interests specifically
toward the heart’s capacity to pump blood; we single this out only because we
happen to already be interested in “the circulatory system’s capacity to transport
food, oxygen, wastes, and so on” (1975, 762). The indiscriminateness is also the
root of some difficulties with the use of such a notion of function to generate a
functionalist approach to the philosophy of mind; see Sober 1985.
63 We might think it worth capturing the normative notion in our analysis, even if
we deny the possibility of knowledge that anything natural really answers to that
notion (as Kant does). Cummins himself rules out malfunction insofar as he
claims that having a function means being able to perform it (1975, 757). See also
Cummins on the heart in the previous note. Those with etiological accounts
stress this complaint: Millikan 1989, 294, Neander 1991, 181.
64 Zumbach 1984, 129 and also 20, effectively reads Kant in this way, insofar as he
denies that Kant’s analysis has implications concerning the origin of a system.
See also McLaughlin’s contrast between function-explanation and teleology, and
his claim that Kant’s interest is not in “a teleological relation at all” (1990, 50).
Warnke 1992 in particular emphasizes a claimed similarity between Kant’s analy-
sis and “teleonomy” (also Düsing 1990, 142).
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tion of function or purpose; he instead limits the status of judgments applying that
notion. It should be no surprise that the resulting notion of function or purpose is
very different: Kant’s notion is teleological, normative and discriminates between
merely external and genuine purposiveness; Cummins’ notion is non-teleological,
non-normative, and indiscriminate in this respect.
Some also see in the second contemporary approach a reason to think that Kant
does (or should) defend a form of teleological explanation of living beings. The idea
is to read Kant as denying that teleology can “explain” only in a special narrow and
technical sense that teleology cannot deduce the structure of a system from general
exceptionless causal laws and prior conditions. But if teleology is supposed to be
completely indifferent to such causal origins, then Kant might still be defending a
distinct role for teleology in biology, one we could recognize as legitimately explana-
tory (even if not in Kant’s narrow sense of deductive causal explanation).65 But this
line of thought is also mistaken. Kant may well endorse some such narrow concep-
tion of explanation generally, but it does not drive this argument. What drives the ar-
gument is an independent claim about teleology in particular: capturing a teleologi-
cal and normative notion of function requires an analysis which imposes constraints
on, and is not indifferent to, the causal history of a system. We saw above that this
claim is well-supported by Kant’s own arguments. You cannot simply decide, because
both appear attractive in different ways, to combine the teleological and normative
notion of function with an indifference to causal origins or etiology. And this point is
affirmed by the contemporary debate about functions; both sides generally agree
that removing the etiological implications yields not a defense of a non-reducible
form of teleological explanation but something very different: a non-teleological and
non-normative notion of function.66
Kant’s approach has its peculiarities, to be sure, but one thing it can do is combine
the primary advantages claimed on behalf of both contemporary approaches: it can
combine (i) recognition of the inevitability and scientific importance of a normative
and teleological notion of function, with (ii) critical doubts that we can know that
such a teleological and normative notion really applies to nature itself. Some will see
a large cost for Kant in any conceptual connection to the idea of intelligent design,
65 Zumbach (especially 1984, 123) advocates this approach. Ginsborg takes Kant to
argue for a role for a normative notion of teleology with no implications about
causal history (2001, 251), though she remains consistent with Kant’s usage and
so does not call this role “explanatory”.
66 Cummins 1975 draws on this claim in arguing that, because teleology has unac-
ceptable implications, the analysis of the scientifically useful notion of function
cannot be etiological. Proponents of the etiological analysis draw on the same
claim to generate complaints about the resulting Cummins-functions being non-
normative (Millikan 1989, 294; Neander 1991, 181). Those who advocate com-
bining the advantages of each analysis do not aim to blur the distinction between
them, but rather to make appropriate but different use of each; see e.g. Griffiths
1993 use of Cummins’ analysis to build what is nonetheless an alternative formu-
lation of an etiological analysis.
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though it is unclear why this should be a drawback given that Kant’s point is to deny
all possibility of theoretical knowledge of intelligent design. Perhaps the most gen-
eral problem is rather that this leaves Kant in a complicated and difficult position: he
must defend an essential role in empirical science for a concept (Naturzweck) whose
application to nature can never itself be the object of empirical knowledge. Many will
see an additional cost in any connection to Kant’s transcendental idealism. But these
are, at very worst, philosophical costs – not reason to think that progress in the bio-
logical sciences has rendered Kant’s position simply obsolete. While I have made no
attempt here at a final comparative weighing of the costs and benefits of each ap-
proach, I have shown that Kant supports his conclusions and highlights the advan-
tages of his position (difficult though it may be) with a tightly unified series of philo-
sophical arguments. Departing from Kant’s conclusions requires rejecting one or
another of his premises. Where contemporary approaches reject these premises, this
generates very real philosophical difficulties – difficulties akin to those Kant himself
seeks to avoid. So contemporary comparisons do not suggest obsolescence. They
point to some surprising and enduring philosophical strengths of Kant’s very differ-
ent approach to teleology, biology, and explanation.67
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